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Abstract
Adversarial attacking aims to fool deep neu-
ral networks with adversarial examples. In the
field of natural language processing, various
textual adversarial attack models have been
proposed, varying in the accessibility to the
victim model. Among them, the attack mod-
els that only require the output of the victim
model are more fit for real-world situations
of adversarial attacking. However, to achieve
high attack performance, these models usu-
ally need to query the victim model too many
times, which is neither efficient nor viable in
practice. To tackle this problem, we propose
a reinforcement learning based attack model,
which can learn from attack history and launch
attacks more efficiently. In experiments, we
evaluate our model by attacking several state-
of-the-art models on the benchmark datasets
of multiple tasks including sentiment analysis,
text classification and natural language infer-
ence. Experimental results demonstrate that
our model consistently achieves both better at-
tack performance and higher efficiency than
recently proposed baseline methods. We also
find our attack model can bring more robust-
ness improvement to the victim model by ad-
versarial training. All the code and data of this
paper will be made public.
1 Introduction
Deep neural networks (DNNs) have been proved
vulnerable to adversarial attacks, which mali-
ciously craft adversarial examples to fool the vic-
tim model (Szegedy et al., 2014; Goodfellow et al.,
2015). For instance, highly poisonous phrases with
minor modification can easily deceive Google’s
toxic comment detection system (Hosseini et al.,
2017). With the broad use of DNN-based natural
language processing (NLP) systems, such as spam
∗Indicates equal contribution.
filtering (Bhowmick and Hazarika, 2018) and mal-
ware detection (McLaughlin et al., 2017), there is
growing concern about their security. As a result,
research into textual adversarial attacking becomes
increasingly important.
In recent years plenty of adversarial attack mod-
els have been proposed (Zhang et al., 2019). Nev-
ertheless, few of them work satisfactorily in real-
world attack situations. Existing adversarial at-
tack models can be roughly classified into four
categories according to the accessibility to the vic-
tim model: gradient-based, score-based, decision-
based and blind models. First, gradient-based mod-
els, also known as white-box models, require full
knowledge of the victim model to perform gradi-
ent computation (Papernot et al., 2016; Ebrahimi
et al., 2018). Unfortunately, we hardly know the ar-
chitecture of the victim model in real-world attack
situations, let alone compute the gradients.
Second, blind models do not need to know any-
thing about the victim model, but their attack per-
formance is usually not good enough, precisely
because of complete ignorance about the victim
model. Specifically, existing blind models either
implement character-level random perturbations
(Ebrahimi et al., 2018) or conduct sentence-level
distracting (Jia and Liang, 2017) and paraphrasing
(Iyyer et al., 2018). However, character-level at-
tacks are easy to repulse (Pruthi et al., 2019), and
sentence-level attacks cannot guarantee attack va-
lidity, i.e, keeping the ground-truth label of the ad-
versarial example the same as original input. More
importantly, the attack success rates of most blind
models are unsatisfactory.
Finally, score- and decision-based attack mod-
els seem to be more suitable for real-world adver-
sarial attack situations. They only need to know
the output of the victim models – the former re-
quires prediction scores and the latter just needs
the final prediction decision. Existing score- and
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decision-based attack models have achieved great
attack performance (Alzantot et al., 2018; Zhao
et al., 2018; Jin et al., 2019; Zang et al., 2020), but
they have a significant problem. To craft an ad-
versarial example, these models have to iteratively
make perturbations and query the victim model too
many times, e.g., a very recent score-based model
needs to query the victim model more than 2, 000
times on average to generate an adversarial exam-
ple (Zang et al., 2020). It is neither efficient nor
practical to invoke the victim model so many times
in real-world situations of adversarial attacking.
We argue that the low efficiency of existing
score- and decision-based attack models results
from that they have no learning ability and simply
follow certain fixed optimization rules to attack,
e.g., greedy algorithm (Jin et al., 2019), genetic al-
gorithm (Alzantot et al., 2018) and particle swarm
optimization (Zang et al., 2020).
To solve this problem, we propose to build an
attack model possessing learning ability, which can
learn lessons from attack history and store them in
its parameters so as to improve attack efficiency.
Considering no labeled data are available in adver-
sarial attacking, we design our model following the
reinforcement learning paradigm. There are two
main operations in our model, including identifying
key words in the original sentences that crucially
influence the decision of the victim model, and se-
lecting appropriate substitutes to replace them. Our
model is aimed at learning an optimal policy under
which a series of substitution operations are itera-
tively conducted to generate adversarial examples.
In experiments, we evaluate our attack model on
the benchmark datasets of three typical NLP tasks
including sentiment analysis, text classification and
natural language inference. The victim models are
respective (nearly) state-of-the-art models of the
datasets, namely ALBERT (Lan et al., 2019), XL-
Net (Yang et al., 2019) and RoBERTa (Liu et al.,
2019), and two open APIs. Since our model can
work in both score- and decision-based attack set-
tings, we carry out experiments in the two settings.
Experimental results show that our attack model
consistently outperforms the baseline methods on
all the datasets in terms of both attack success rate
and attack efficiency. We also find our model can
bring more robustness improvement to the victim
model by adversarial training.
2 Related Work
As mentioned above, textual adversarial attack
models can be categorized into four classes accord-
ing to the accessibility to victim model, namely
gradient-based, score-based, decision-based and
blind models.
Gradient-based attack models, also named white-
box attack models, require full knowledge of the
victim model to calculate the gradient with respect
to the model input. They are mostly inspired by
the fast gradient sign method (Goodfellow et al.,
2015) and forward derivative method (Papernot
et al., 2016) of adversarial attacking on computer
vision, and make some adaptations to the discrete
text (Papernot et al., 2016; Sato et al., 2018; Liang
et al., 2018; Ebrahimi et al., 2018; Wallace et al.,
2019a). In real-world attack situations, gradient-
based models are hardly able to work because the
victim model is usually not fully accessible.
In contrast to white-box attack models, black-
box attack models do not need to possess complete
knowledge of the victim model, and can be subclas-
sified into score-based, decision-based and blind
models. Blind models are ignorant of the victim
model at all. Therefore, they can only make arbi-
trary perturbations, e.g., adding relevant sentences
(Jia and Liang, 2017), paraphrasing (Iyyer et al.,
2018) and random character-level perturbations in-
cluding substitution, deletion and swapping (Be-
linkov and Bisk, 2018; Gao et al., 2018). These
models are hard to achieve high attack performance.
And they tend to change the ground-truth label of
the original input or can be easily resisted (Pruthi
et al., 2019).
Score- and decision-based attack models are
more fit for realistic adversarial attack situations.
Score-based models rely on the prediction scores
of the victim model, e.g., classification probabili-
ties of all the classes, while decision-based models
require the final decision of the victim model only,
e.g., the predicted class. Quite a lot of attack mod-
els are score-based, e.g., word substitution attack
models based on genetic algorithm (Alzantot et al.,
2018), greedy algorithm (Ren et al., 2019; Jin et al.,
2019), Metropolis-Hastings sampling (Zhang et al.,
2019) and particle swarm optimization (Zang et al.,
2020), visually similar character substitution model
(Eger et al., 2019), and human-in-the-loop adver-
sarial writing model (Wallace et al., 2019b). Only
a few of existing attack models are decision-based,
e.g., performing perturbations in the continuous la-
tent semantic space (Zhao et al., 2018) and rewrit-
ing sentences following semantically equivalent
adversarial rules (Ribeiro et al., 2018). Most of
score- and decision-based models utilize the out-
put of the victim model (prediction scores or final
decision) as guiding signals and adjust the pertur-
bations iteratively. Although effective, they suffer
serious problem of efficiency. To obtain a high at-
tack success rate, these models normally need to
query the victim model thousands of times, which
is actually impractical in real-world adversarial at-
tack situations.
3 Methodology
In this section, we delineate our attack model,
which can work in both score- and decision-based
attack settings. We first present an overview of our
model in 3.1, and then we detail our model in the
score- and decision-based attack settings in 3.2 and
3.3 respectively.
3.1 Model Overview
Our attack model is designed for word-level attacks,
which have been considered to have better overall
attack performance as compared to character- and
sentence-level attacks (Wang et al., 2019; Zang
et al., 2020). There are two main operations in our
attack model.
(1) The first one is to identify key words to be
substituted in the original sentence. Previous work
has demonstrated that prediction results of neu-
ral network-based text classification models are
highly dependent on several key words (Li et al.,
2016). Therefore, it would be effectual to find and
substitute the key words in the original input in
adversarial attacks.
(2) The second operation is to select appropri-
ate substitutes to replace the identified key words.
Here a set of candidate substitutes have already
been prepared for each word in the original sen-
tence, which can be generated by some candidate
substitute nomination methods such as synonym
substitution. Theoretically, our attack model can
be combined with any candidate substitute nomi-
nation method. In experiments, we combine three
representative ones with our attack model for eval-
uation.
By making a substitution, a potential adversarial
example is generated, and we can use it to attack
the victim model. If successful, i.e., the victim
model yields a prediction result that is different
from the ground-truth label of the the original in-
put, we terminate this process and output the adver-
sarial example, otherwise we repeat above steps to
iteratively make substitutions.
Seeing no labeled data are available in adver-
sarial attacking, to endow our attack model with
learning ability, we adopt the reinforcement learn-
ing paradigm. Specifically, we regard the above
two operations as the action, and our goal is to
learn a policy under which an adversarial example
is generated by taking a series of actions (substitu-
tion operations). Next we give a brief introduction
to policy gradient (Sutton et al., 2000), the method
we use for policy learning.
Brief Introduction to Policy Gradient
In reinforcement learning, an agent is expected to
learn an optimal policy to earn maximum rewards
in a Markov decision process (Sutton and Barto,
2018). Each step of the process t ∈ {0, 1, · · · , T −
1} can be described by the triplet of state st, ac-
tion at and reward rt. Total rewards of the whole
process with respect to a parameterized policy θ is
J(θ) = E(
T−1∑
t=0
γtrt|θ), (1)
where γ ∈ [0, 1] is the discount factor weighting
future rewards less than immediate rewards.
Policy gradient optimizes the policy θ by gradi-
ent ascent:
θ ← θ + α∇θJ(θ), (2)
where α is the learning rate. To calculate∇θJ(θ),
a common algorithm is REINFORCE (Williams,
1992; Sutton and Barto, 2018). It is based on the
Monte Carlo method and approximately calculates
∇θJ(θ) by
∇θJ(θ) ∼
T−1∑
t=0
∇θ log piθ(at|st)Gt, (3)
where piθ(at|st) is the probability of taking ac-
tion at in state st under the policy θ, and Gt =∑T−1
t′=t γ
t′−trt′ .
3.2 Score-based Attacking
In this subsection, we describe our attack model in
the score-based attack setting, in which the predic-
tion scores of the victim model with respect to any
input are accessible.
As mentioned above, our attack model is sup-
posed to learn a policy which directs the two ac-
tions including key word identification and substi-
tute selection. We parameterize the policy with
two sets of probability vectors which are related to
the two actions respectively. Next we present our
model step by step.
Policy Initialization Suppose x is the original
sentence that we want to perturb and has m words,
i.e., x = w1w2 · · ·wm, we first design an m-
dimensional key word identification probability
vector px, whose i-th dimension is the probabil-
ity that wi is identified as a key word and substi-
tuted. Each dimension of px is initialized to 1m .
For each wi, we design an ni-dimensional substi-
tute selection probability vector qxi , where ni is
the number of the candidate substitutes of wi. The
j-th dimension of qxi is the probability that wi is
replaced by its j-th candidate substitute. We ini-
tialize each dimension of qxi with
1
ni
. Here px and
Qx = {qx1 , · · · ,qxm} constitute the parameters of
the policy.
Sampling For a given original sentence x, we
first implement sampling without replacement from
the probability distribution px to obtain T = bδmc
words to be substituted, where δ is the maximum
modification rate stipulating the upper limit of the
proportion of substituted words. These words to
be substituted form a set S. Then for each ws ∈ S,
we sample one word w′s from the probability dis-
tribution of its candidate substitutes qxs . Next we
iteratively substitute all the sampled words ws ∈ S
with w′s one by one. Each substitution can generate
a potential adversarial example, and there are T
potential adversarial examples in total. If one of
them induces the victim model to yield a prediction
result different from the ground-truth label of the
original input x, the algorithm terminates and out-
puts that adversarial example. Otherwise, we move
on to calculating the reward of each substitution to
update parameters.
Reward Calculation We desire the victim
model not to predict the original sentence’s ground-
truth label as much as possible. Hence, we define
the reward of the t-th substitution rt as the decre-
ments of the prediction score of the ground-truth
label. Specifically,
rt = P (yg|x)− P (yg|xt), (4)
where xt is the generated potential adversarial ex-
ample after the t-th substitution, and P (yg|x) is the
prediction score of the original sentence’s ground-
truth label given by the victim model.
Policy Updating We use policy gradient to up-
date θ = (px,Qx), as in Equation (2) and (3). Af-
terwards, the algorithm goes back to the Sampling
step to re-generate potential adversarial examples.
3.3 Decision-based Attacking
In the decision-based attack setting, prediction
scores of the victim model are unavailable. There-
fore, we cannot calculate the reward and optimize
the policy as in the score-based attack setting. A
simple workaround is to set the reward in Equation
(4) to a negative constant if the substitution does
not generate an adversarial example. Although
workable, the attack performance would be very
limited. To improve attack performance, we also
make adaptations of policy initialization.
Previous work has proved the transferability of
adversarial examples (Goodfellow et al., 2015),
which means an adversarial example designed for
a victim model is also likely to fool another victim
model. We aim to utilize this transferability by
initializing a decision-based attack model with the
policy of a score-based attack model that has been
pre-trained to attack another virtual victim model.
However, original parameterization restricts the
transferability of policy, i.e., each original sentence
x has a specific policy parameterized by px andQx
which cannot be transferred. To solve this problem,
we adjust the parameterization of the policy for the
pre-trained score-based attack model.
For the probability distribution of key word iden-
tification, instead of directly using a probability
vector, we design a regression model f to learn it:
px = fϑ(x), (5)
where ϑ denotes the parameters of f . We choose
BERT (Devlin et al., 2019) plus a multi-layer per-
ceptron as the regression model. During attacking
we freeze BERT and all the learnable parameters
are from the multi-layer perceptron.
For the parameter related to substitute selection,
we make the probability vector associated with the
target word itself only, i.e., Qx → Q = {qw|w ∈
V}, where V is the vocabulary.
With these adjustments, we train a score-based
attack model by attacking a virtual victim model
with accessible prediction scores. Since we have no
idea of the architecture of the true victim model, we
can simply choose a popular classification model
such as LSTM (Hochreiter and Schmidhuber, 1997)
and BERT as the virtual victim model. The policy
parameters ϑ and Q are updated by policy gradient
and finally stored.
Afterwards, we use the policy parameters of the
trained score-based attack model to initialize the
policy of the decision-based attack model. And
then we iteratively conduct sampling, reward calcu-
lation and policy update until finding an adversarial
example.1
4 Experiments
In this section, we empirically evaluate our attack
model on three typical NLP tasks including senti-
ment analysis, text classification, and natural lan-
guage inference in both score- and decision-based
attack settings.
4.1 Datasets and Victim Models
For each task, we choose one representative bench-
mark dataset for evaluation and one (nearly) state-
of-the-art model as the victim model. To improve
the diversity and extensiveness of the evaluation,
we intentionally choose three different victim mod-
els. All of them are popular large pre-trained mod-
els and have powerful performance across many
language understanding tasks.
(1) For sentiment analysis, we use the SST-2
dataset (Socher et al., 2013), which is composed of
sentences with “positive” or “negative” labels. The
victim model we choose is ALBERT (Lan et al.,
2019), whose specific version is ALBERT-xxlarge.
(2) For text classification, we utilize AG News
corpus (Zhang et al., 2015) as the evaluation
dataset, which comprises news articles that are cat-
egorized into four classes: World, Sports, Busi-
ness, and Sci/Tech. We use XLNet (Yang et al.,
2019), specifically XLNet-large-cased, as the vic-
tim model.
(3) For natural language inference, we use the
matched MNLI dataset (Williams et al., 2018)
(MNLI-m), in which each instance is composed
of a sentence pair (premise and hypothesis) and a
relational label (entailment, contradiction or neu-
tral). The victim model on this task is RoBERTa
(Liu et al., 2019) (RoBERTa-large).
To evaluate our model in a more realistic situa-
tion, we also choose two open APIs as the victim
1Theoretically we can also use a pre-trained model to ini-
tialize the policy of a score-based attack model, but we find
the performance boost is marginal as compared with the ex-
tra cost of time in experiments. Besides, the adjusted policy
parameterization is only used in the pre-trained attack model
because it needs to update much more parameters (ϑ vs. px)
when attacking one instance which is quite inefficient for real
adversarial attacks.
models on sentiment analysis, namely Microsoft
Azure Text Analytics2 for score-based attacking,
and the Meaning Cloud sentiment analysis API3 for
decision-based attacking. The evaluation dataset is
still SST-2. Details of the datasets and performance
of the victim models are shown in Table 1.
4.2 Baseline Methods
Score-based Baseline Methods
There are many score-based attack models, and we
select three representative word-level score-based
models as the baselines, which utilize different at-
tack algorithms and candidate substitute nomina-
tion methods.
GA+Embedding. This attack model (Alzantot
et al., 2018) adopts the genetic algorithm (GA)
to generate adversarial examples and uses word
embedding distance to determine candidate substi-
tutes.
PWWS+Synonym. This baseline model (Ren
et al., 2019) employs the greedy algorithm based on
the probability weighted word saliency (PWWS)
and nominates synonyms from WordNet (Miller,
1995) as candidate substitutes.
PSO+Sememe. This model (Zang et al., 2020)
is based on the particle swarm optimization (PSO)
algorithm (Eberhart and Kennedy, 1995), where
the candidate substitutes are nominated via a kind
of special sememe knowledge (Bloomfield, 1926).
Previous experimental results showed that this
model achieved state-of-the-art attack results.
To ensure evaluation fairness, we combine our
attack model (denoted by RL) with the baselines’
respective candidate substitute nomination methods
and conduct one-to-one comparison.
Decision-based Baseline Methods
As stated in related work, to the best of our knowl-
edge, there are only a few decision-based attack
models and none of them are word-level. There-
fore, we choose a sentence-level decision-based
attack model (Zhao et al., 2018) as the baseline.
This model uses an autoencoder to encode the orig-
inal sentence into a vector, then adds some noise
and finally decodes the perturbed vector into a sen-
tence, i.e., a potential adversarial example. This
process is repeated until an adversarial example is
2https://azure.microsoft.com/
en-us/services/cognitive-services/
text-analytics/
3https://www.meaningcloud.com/
products/sentiment-analysis
Dataset Task #Classes #Train #Validation #Test Victim Model Accuracy
SST-2 Sentiment Analysis 2 6,920 872 1,821 ALBERT / MA / MC 94.49 / 71.61 / 72.75
AG News Text Classification 4 96,000 24,000 7,600 XLNet 94.67
MNLI-m Natural Language Inference 3 382,885 9,817 9,815 RoBERTa 89.28
Table 1: Details of three evaluation datasets and the accuracy results of corresponding victim models. MA and MC
denote Microsoft Azure and Meaning Cloud APIs respectively.
generated that successfully fools the victim model.
We denote this model as AED.
Furthermore, to make the comparison more ex-
tensive, we adapt two score-based baselines in-
cluding GA+Embedding and PSO+Sememe to the
decision-based attack setting.4 They originally
use the variation of the prediction scores given
by the victim model to direct their attacks. We
simply change the required prediction score vari-
ation to a binary success/fail signal. We denote
the two revised methods as GA’+Embedding and
PSO’+Sememe respectively.
4.3 Experimental Settings
Hyper-parameters and Training The learning
rates of px and qxi in our attack model are set to 0.2
and 0.5 respectively. The discount factor γ is 0.4.
In the decision-based attack setting, the multi-layer
perceptron of the pre-trained score-based attack
model has two layers whose sizes are 768 × 32
and 32× 1 respectively, the virtual victim model is
BERT, and the the reward is −1. More details of
our model’s hyper-parameter settings are given in
the appendix. For all the baseline methods, we use
their recommended hyper-parameter settings.
Evaluation Settings Following previous work
(Alzantot et al., 2018; Zang et al., 2020), we re-
strict the length of attacked original sentences to
10-100, and set the maximum word modification
rate of adversarial examples to 25%. We evaluate
the attack performance from three perspectives in-
cluding attack success rate, attack efficiency and
attack validity. (1) Attack success rate is the per-
centage of the attacks that successfully craft ad-
versarial examples and fool the victim model. We
calculate the attack success rates of attack models
within different limits on the maximum number of
victim model queries. (2) To evaluate attack effi-
ciency, we use the average number of victim model
queries used for attacking an instance as the metric.
(3) Attack validity reflects whether an adversarial
4PWWS+Synonym cannot be adapted to the decision-
based attack setting.
Attack Model
SST-2 AG News MNLI-m SST-2
ALBERT XLNet RoBERTa API
GA+Embedding 365.69 639.68 228.44 27.65
RL+Embedding 83.96 77.69 48.14 17.83
PWWS+Synonym 101.15 173.03 85.61 100.06
RL+Synonym 92.51 153.17 47.49 58.42
PSO+Sememe 177.85 212.24 71.81 65.22
RL+Sememe 80.85 92.81 38.64 53.54
Table 2: Average numbers of victim model queries in
the score-based attack setting.
Attack Model
SST-2 AG News MNLI-m SST-2
ALBERT XLNet RoBERTa API
AED 260.78 345.00 140.29 249.60
GA’+Embedding 299.14 557.07 162.52 29.48
RL+Embedding 69.79 55.00 49.62 33.90
PSO’+Sememe 158.72 117.49 66.33 49.45
RL+Sememe 51.42 56.56 27.58 33.24
Table 3: Average numbers of victim model queries in
the decision-based attack setting.
example has the same ground-truth label as the
original sentence, and we carry out human evalua-
tion to evaluate it. Details of human evaluation are
given in the appendix.
4.4 Experimental Results
Attack Success Rate Figure 1-4 illustrate the at-
tack success rates of our attack model and three
baseline methods against four victim models (in-
cluding an API) in the score-based attack setting
respectively, and Figure 5 shows the attack success
rates in the decision-based attack setting. We can
observe that in both attack settings, our model con-
sistently achieves higher success rates than all the
baseline methods against whichever victim model,
which demonstrates the superiority of our model.
In addition, we find that the limit of victim model
queries has considerable impact on attack success
rate. When maximum number of victim model
queries is very small, the attack success rates are
quite low, which reflects the importance of attack
efficiency in realistic attack situations.
Attack Efficiency Table 2 and 3 list the average
numbers of victim model queries of different attack
models against different victim models in the score-
Figure 1: Attack success rates of different score-based attack models against ALBERT on SST-2.
Figure 2: Attack success rates of different score-based attack models against XLNet on AG News.
Figure 3: Attack success rates of different score-based attack models against RoBERTa on MNLI-m.
Figure 4: Attack success rates of different score-based attack models against Microsoft Azure API on SST-2.
Considering the time (about 1s per query) and cost (about $0.2 per 100 queries) of accessing the API, the upper
limit of the maximum number of victim queries is 300 rather than 1, 000 as for the other victim models. The same
is true for the Meaning Cloud API in the decision-based attack setting.
and decision-based attack settings, respectively.5
We observe that our model basically needs least
queries of the victim model, even though it has the
highest attack success rates (as shown in Figure
1-5). It demonstrates the high efficiency of our
model.
5These results are based on the setting that the maximum
number of victim model queries is 1000 for ALBERT, XLNet
and RoBERTa, and 300 for the two APIs.
Attack Validity According to the results of hu-
man evaluation and significance tests, our attack
model performs equally as compared with baseline
methods in terms of attack validity. More details of
the attack validity results are given in the appendix.
4.5 Adversarial Training
Adversarial training, which augments training
data with adversarial examples, is believed to be
an effective method of improving model robust-
(a) Attacking ALBERT on SST-2 (b) Attacking XLNet on AG News
(c) Attacking RoBERTa on MNLI-m (d) Attacking Meaning Cloud API on SST-2
Figure 5: Attack success rates of different decision-based attack models.
Figure 6: Decrements of attack success rates brought
by adversarial training using different amounts of ad-
versarial examples (denoted by the ratio to training
size). “Defend” represents the attack model used for
adversarial training.
ness against adversarial attacks (Goodfellow et al.,
2015). In this experiment, we try re-training AL-
BERT using SST-2’s training data augmented with
different amounts of adversarial examples that are
generated by attacking the training instances, and
observe the change of attack success rates under
score-based adversarial attacks. We conduct com-
parison with PSO+Sememe, which has the highest
attack performance among three baseline methods.
Figure 6 shows the results, where the maximum
number of victim model queries is 1, 000. From the
perspective of defense, by comparing the results
from different adversarial training methods, namely
— vs. — as well as · · · vs. · · · , we can find that the
adversarial examples generated by our model can
bring more robustness improvement to the victim
model than PSO, even against PSO’s attacks. From
the perspective of attack, by comparing the results
from different attack models, namely — vs. · · · as
well as — vs. · · · , we conclude that our model is
more difficult to overcome by adversarial training.
5 Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we propose a reinforcement learning-
based textual adversarial attack model aimed at
real-world adversarial attack situations. It can work
in both score- and decision-based attack settings
and possesses learning ability so as to launch at-
tacks more efficiently. We also find that our model
can bring more robustness improvement to the vic-
tim model by adversarial training as compared with
existing baselines.
In the future, we will work towards further en-
hancing attack efficiency and improving attack per-
formance in the situation of extremely limited vic-
tim model queries. In addition, we will explore
how to make model more robust by adversarial
training or other methods.
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